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A Formalism for Management of Surprise
or
How I learned to Design Dams and to Hate Systems Analysis
M.B Fiering
After many centuries of designing engineering structures
and systems within a deterministic framework, it has become
fashionable to deal explicitly with uncertainty as an
important component of planning and design strategies.
Advances in applied statistical decision theory, coupled
with the wide availability of computing machinery, are at
the root of this transformation, and the recent ｬ ｩ ｴ ･ ｾ ｡ ｴ ｵ ｲ ･
is ｲ ･ ｰ ｬ ｾ ｴ ･ with studies of systems, large and small, under
various conditions of uncertainty. This paper deals with
a few rules for decision-making under a special category of
uncertainty--namely that associated with ｴ ｨ ｾ occurrence of
events which could not be foretold, let alone assigned a
prior probability of realization within a given desigri
horizon.
The use of liberal factors of safety has a long history in
engineering design; it is commonplace to be derisive about
these factors, and to call them "factors of ignorance" or
other less endearing terms. But this is not entirely fair,
because it has been traditional to have the safety factor
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reflect the degree of uncertainty inherent in the design.
and the cost (or danger) associated with failure. We speak
here of the more obvious modes of failure; these include
structural failure or collapse (of a building, a dam, an
hydraulic control line) and operational failure (inadequate
flood storage, inadequate irrigation supply, etc.). Thus
we note that structural safety factors are of the order of
1.5 or 2.0, while the safety factor against failure of an
earth dam by sudden drawdown, based on extremely conserva-
tive assumptions, is around 1.1. It is impossible to assign
specific numerical factors of safety against hydrologic
extrema, but we try to identify flood frequency character-
istics and design against an event characterized by a
ｳｰｾ｣ｩｦｩ｣ return interval.
To these elemental considerations of uncertainty we must add
a few new classes. Suppose we have at our disposal two
decision variables, x and y, and that we seek those values
* *(or that decision), say x,y for which the system response
* *f(x ,y ) is optimal. Typically the function f is some
measure of net benefits or the benefit: cost ,ratio, appro-
priately discounted. The decision variables x,y are gener-
ally not free to range over all possible values but they,
or some functions of them, are constrained by the conditions
of the problem. Thus the derivatives of f with respect to
the decision variables are not necessarily zero at the
optimum.
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We consider Figure 1, the contour map defined by the loci
of equal response, or functional value f, on which it is
desired to locate the decision (or x,y couple) where the
response f(x,y) is maximal. Under the first class of
uncertainty we decide on the values x,y(to be built) and
undertake ｾ ｯ ｮ ｳ ｴ ｲ ｵ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｎ In this section, we use the terms
build and construction as if all decisions were structural
components. But this is merely to avoid the ungainly ter-
minology associated with repeating each time that a decision
can be an operating rule or management decision, not merely
a structural measure or capacity. For a variety of reasons
relating to structural inhomogeneity, unreliable quality
control, communication or human errors, etc., the finished
system is characterized by a design different from the
scheduled couple x,y; we call this Ｈ ｸ Ｋ ｾ ｸ Ｌ ｹ Ｋ ｾ ｹ Ｉ Ｌ as shown
on Figure 1. This is tantamount to a small movement in
decision space, but the contours of system response remain
ｵ ｮ ｣ ｨ ｡ ｮ ｧ ｾ ､ Ｎ This class of uncertainty is traditionally
treated by application of a factor of safety.
The second form of uncertainty is the target of much of the
massive effort in stochastic modelling of systems, particu-
larly those which ,purport to represent environmental,
ecological, meteorological and socio-economic interactions.
It accommodates the fact that system components (typically
classified as inputs, controls, demands and outputs) are
rarely known deterministicallY. For example, streamflows,
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population projections, economic demand functions, the
discount rate(s) and ecological processes can be estimated
more or less well, and the importance of devoting explicit
attention to their variations or instabilities dictates the
extent to which stochastic considerations must be built into
decision models. In the notation of Figure 1, we specify
the decision x,y but realize a response
f' (x,Y) = f(x,y) + I:::.f(x,y)
where the increment I:::.f(x,y) measures the departure from the
surface f(x,y). The magnitude of this departure depends on
random influences effective ｡ ｾ the particular couple or
decision vector x,y. In other words, the surface f(x,y) is
replaced by a mantle of variable thickness, with those
responses highly susceptible to random fluctuation associ-
ated with thick mantles within which the actual system
response might reasonably fall, while more predictable
responses lie within closely contained mantles. We concep-
tualize the addition of at least one additional dimension
to the ｾ ｹ ｳ ｴ ･ ｭ description; this dimension subtends some
deterministic scalar response. But if response includes
random fluctuations, then at least one additional dimension
is required to describe the variation. However many
dimensions are utilized, it is clear that the response
surface itself remains fixed and that the realized outcomes
migrate among the cloud of points which define the uncer-
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tainties inherent in system performance. As in the first
class of uncertainty, we try to deal more precisely with
where a particular realization or outcome will reside,
contingent on a set of alternative responses and on some
information concerning our ability to describe or even
define the relevant random processes.
We now move to the third, and most interesting, class of
uncertainty. It differs from the first two in that, the
response surface changes after the decision x,y is imple-
mented. Many examples can be drawn from ecological experi-
ence; a classic case is that of the use of DDT. After
years 'Jf \oJidespread application, the llrules of the game"
ｷ ｾ ｲ ･ 30ruptly modified and the response surface associated
with the decision to spray was drastically changed, reflec-
ting important damages and losses. Another case is the
occurrence of a major environmental accident ... a chEmical
or oil spill, a nuclear accident, a pollution episode of
one sort ,)r another ... which causes the ecological system
teo "f1ip ll (cf' Holling
and ｆ ｩ Ｌ ｾ ｲ ｩ ng and Holling: I"lanagement "md Pers is tence of
Perturbed Ecosystems, IIASA Ecology ｐ ｲ ｯ ｪ ･ ｾ ｾ Ｌ 1974) from one
domain of stability to another. In other words, with
rp ｦ ･ ｲ ｾ ｲ ｊ ｣ ･ to Figure 1, a whole set of new contours is dealt
and the system is evaluated under a new regime, 0r under
new criteria.
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It might be argued that the consequences of such "surprises"
could be reduced by the collection of more and better data
and better understanding of the natural order of things.
Indeed, a calculus has been advanced for specification of
optimal data bases in special problems. The point here is
that systems applications in important areas of human
endeavor invariably deal with significant information gaps
and uncertainties; moreover, no foreseeable models, no
incipj (-'nt insights, will reduce these uncertainties and
gaps to levels which completely preclude surprise. The
consequence of these gaps is that inconsistencies can enter
the decision-making process; we propose here a strategy for
dealing systematically with them.
At some earlier time in the history of technology the issue
might not have been so serious, but our society is being
ir.exorably driven toward problems of a larger scale, toward
global considerations, toward scientific and technologic
in-cerventions and commitments which for all practical
purposes are irreversible. We cannot hedge much longer,
for example, with respect to generation of primary energy
or its ultimate distribution through secondary and tertiary
networks, even while legitimate environmental interests
press for more rigorous pollution standards and better
enforcement. The arguments are compelling, conjuring
images of generations yet unborn, of denuded forests and
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of imbalances far more serious than the mere destruction
of a particular piece of wilderness. It is not appropriate
here to entertain the meta-physical arguments concerning
the extent of our responsibility toward these future
generations, or to interject jUdgments on whether or not
we are so powerfully committed along a trajectory of con-
sumption that preservation on our planet of life as we know
it represents a feasible target. The inescapable facts
are that we are galloping toward decisions which refuse to
be delayed, that we will never have enough information to
be perfectly comfortable about having to make them, that
they have such long lead times for implementation as to be
essentially irreversible, and that they are too expensive
to initiate parallel tracks which allow for some maneuver-
ing room. Part of the information basis for jUdging these
decisions is the extent to which we, or our progeny, might
be surprised by their consequences. We seek a calculus of
surprise which can be utilized, with some of the more
traditional mptrics, for evaluation of program options.
An example of surprise in a non-ecological setting is the
recent history of U.S. oil policy and its consequences.
For generations Arab disunity dictated reliance on the
security of oil supplies to the fr.S., and it seemed that
contingency plans need not be made. But a measure of
Arab unity was achieved, and however good the U.S. "system"
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for generating and distributing energy from oil, it per-
formed badly under the changed rules. It was, and presume-
ably still is, inflexible, strongly sUbject to surprise;
the long gasoline lines bore testimony to this.
Tnese questions can be paraphrased in the ecological terms
introduced by Holling. How resilient is the proposed
system? How great is its capacity to absorb unanticipated
perturbation and to continue usefully to function? How
brittle is its optimum? Can it roll with the punches? Can
it persist under environmental stresses whose magnitudes
and frequencies cannot be foreseen? Can we trust our
system to withstand stresses whose origins are now, and
surely will remain, unfathomable?
This paper addresses a design formalism for systems which
must operate under threat of extrema, inclUding those
events for which estimates of sUbjective probability can
reasonably ｢ ｾ made (e.g., extraordinary floods beyond the
worst flood of record, the carcinogenic effects of
cyclamates, etc.) and events which cannot be defined, let
alone associated with some level of probability. For
example, we could not reasonably have predicted a priori
the now well-known effects of DDT, nor could we have
agreed on a probability density for various intensities of
these effects even if some perceptive biochemist had
sounded the alarm. Moreover, no clear policy could have
emerged simply by documenting the ecological threat; the
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trade-off between damage (particularly limited damage) and
starvation (assuming for the moment that there is no
immediately available alternative for pest control) is
very elusive, and certainly depends on whether the decision-
maker is starving, prepared to augment someone else's
depleted crop, or merely looking on from afar.
Holling and others have remarked that our knowledge of
ecosystems, however extensive, will always be exceeded by
our ignorance. Thus we will always run the risk of being
surpri ｾ Ｚ ［ ･ ､ by environmental consequences, and a traditional
factor of safety, at least in the structural sense, is
inadequate protection against this form of surprise. We
thus GjstinguifJh between ｣ ｾ ｬ ｣ ｵ ｬ ｡ ｴ ･ ､ risk, however that
calculQtion might be made, and surprise. This difference
is mor8 profound than the familiar distinction between
risk and uncertainty. We deal here with events which are
not defined, not merely with those events for which we
cannot reasonably assign probabilities. We plan to promote
resili0nt systems, to discourage brittle ones. We plan to
explore the region of the response surface near the
optimum, to determine what happens if the system "flips"
off its peak and tumbles into the surrounding lower region
ｾ ｯ ｷ steep? How far down? How fast?) And we plan to
investigate what happens if the rules are changed to the
extent that a new deck of contours is dealt. We posit
that the peak of the response surface may not be the best
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place to be because it may be so situated with respect to
the boundaries of the domain of stability that a surprise
will drive the system beyond its stable regime into a new,
uncharted domain.
An Example
Consider the water-resource system in Figure 2. Two up-
stream reservoirs service in-stream water demands in
accordance with the standard or Z-shaped operating policy
in Fir;ure 3. The policy is characterized by two parameters,
the reservoir capacity and the target draft, and by the
assumption that the total inflow for the current time
period (day, week, month, season, year or whatever) is
known at the start of that period. This appears to be
very restrictive, but experience over many years suggests
that reservoir inflow and outflow are continuous variables
and that the characteristic time period for most models
can be made small, thereby rendering the assumption
acceptable. The abscissa of Figure 3 gives the total
amount of water available, consisting of initial reservoir
contents plus inflow during the period. The policy
ordains that if this is not greater than the target, the
total supply is released and the reservoir remains empty.
Any available supply in excess of the target is stored
until the capacity of the reservoir is reached, whereupqn
the reservoir spills unavoidably.
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Under the initial objectives promulgated for this simple"
system, each reservoir services its associated target
without regard for the other reservoir or for the potential
use to which the water might be put by the city located
downstream, but there is a penalty function for not meet-
ing a downstream target expressed at the city. Releases
from the two reservoirs are assumed to be additive with
respect to the downstream target, and there is no interme-
diate or unregulated inflow entering the system between
either reservoir and the city. Thus if one upstream target
were violated, the downstream target might still be met by
a spill from the other reservoir. It is convenient to
think of the upstream targets as in-stream uses, but this
need not necessarily be the case. The reservoirs could be
used to meet irrigation targets on the assumption that the
return flow over a long time period, say a year, were
equal to the diversion. The point is not to quibble over
the exact uses of the water but to investigate system
performance under this and a new set of system objectives.
We assign benefits to the several releases. The numerical
values of flows, storages, targets and capacities are all
integers to facilitate computation in this example, so
that costs and benefits are then readily tabulated for
each of the few possible draft and capacity ｣ ｯ ｭ ｢ ｩ ｮ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｾ Ｎ
The inflows are presumed to derive from a Markov process
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at each dam site, with the relevant data shown as part of
Figure 2.
It is then a simple matter to calculate the steady-state
inflow distributions at each site, the steady-state
storage probabilities at each reservoir, and the draft
probabilities at each site and at the city. From these
and from the simple benefit functions we compute expected
net benefits, the benefit:cost ratio (discounted and un-
discounted) and a few miscellaneous summary statistics
for system operation. There is nothing extraordinary about
this 8xercise; it has been done, for one reservoir, by
Thomas in 1958 (Harold A. Thomas, Jr: unpublished memoran-
dum to the Harvard Water Program), by Fiering (for corre-
lated Gaussian flows) in 1961 (Myron Fiering: Queueing
Theory and Reservoir Design JASCE, Hyd Di0,and by others
since. It is a straight-forward matter to locate the
optimal design (or combination of targets and capacities),
albeit it is a tiresome computation. Suppose each reser-
voir can be as large as 3 volume units (4 choices) and
that the annual flows cannot exeed 4 units. It is then
sensible to talk of annual targets of 1 or 2 volume units,
so that the total number of design combinations, at both
reservoirs is 4 x 4 x 2 x 2 = 64. One of these is optimal,
as shown in Table 1.
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